After the sweeping electoral victory of Péter Magyar, Hungary entered a new political era as the new prime minister was sworn in symbolically on Europe’s Day. The previous sixteen years under Viktor Orbán were marked by significant democratic erosion and state capture, alongside the gradual distancing of Hungary from its Western partners and alliances. At the same time, Budapest strengthened ties with ideologically aligned leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, including political actors in the Western Balkans. Over time, Hungary emerged both as an influential regional actor and as one of the most disruptive forces in the Western Balkans, by offering political and financial backing to like-minded leaders and by undermining European consensus on major decisions related to EU enlargement.

The analysis looks into the changing role of Hungary in the Western Balkans and argues that with the regime change in Budapest, positive changes are to be expected. Some aspects will remain intact, including Hungary’s support for the region’s EU integration and the country’s engagement in international peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, the regional illiberal network, spearheaded by Orbán himself, will no longer be supported by the new Hungarian government - neither politically nor financially. Although ties to regional strongmen will remain pragmatic, the new political reality would provide an opportunity for Pristina and Sarajevo to strengthen their ties with Hungary without the (malign) influence of Belgrade and Banja Luka on Budapest.

Hungary and the Western Balkans

The Western Balkans has remained the one region where Hungary has been able to exert influence beyond what might normally be expected from a relatively small state. Geographic proximity, shared historical experiences, economic potentials, ideology-driven political partnerships, and the existence of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina have all supported Orbán’s ambitions to position Hungary as a regional actor.

The Western Balkans, however, had strategic importance for Budapest well before Orbán’s rise to power, and several elements of Hungary’s regional engagement predate the former prime minister’s 16-year-long period in office. Certain aspects of Hungarian foreign policy have been carried over from one government to the next, including under Orbán, who preserved continuity in several areas.

Support for Euro-Atlantic integration has consistently represented a central pillar of Hungary’s Western Balkans policy. Despite the Hungarian government’s increasingly hostile rhetoric toward “Brussels” and its repeated anti-EU messaging in both domestic and foreign policy contexts, Budapest has remained firmly supportive of NATO and EU enlargement in the region. Politically, Hungary has emphasised the geopolitical necessity of integrating the Western Balkans - especially Serbia - into the EU. The view that enlargement represents a geopolitical imperative existed long before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At the technical level, it has assisted regional countries in understanding and implementing the EU acquis.

Over the last decade, Hungary has increased both its personnel and capabilities within international peacekeeping missions in the region, particularly KFOR in Kosovo and IFOR/SFOR, later EUFOR Althea, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hungary also became the first post-socialist NATO member to assume the annual command of both KFOR and EUFOR in 2021–2022 and 2024, respectively. Hungarian contingents received positive assessments from NATO allies, including the United States, for their professionalism and leadership.

In recent years, Hungary’s activities in the Western Balkans have come under growing international scrutiny. Several dimensions of its presence - primarily political and ideological - have been regarded as problematic, including media acquisitions, political and financial support for illiberal leaders (particularly Milorad Dodik), and the cultivation of a network of illiberal actors whose narratives and ideological positions - such as scepticism toward the West, Western institutions, norms, and principles - often overlap with Russian interests. In this sense, Hungary has increasingly acted as a driver of illiberal influence abroad, with the Western Balkans serving as its first and most effective testing ground. Altogether, these developments indicate that Hungary has evolved into a facilitator of illiberal diffusion by enabling, legitimising, and at times shielding political actors who diverge from the democratic standards officially promoted by the EU.

Magyar’s “new-old” foreign policy toward the Western Balkans

The landslide victory of the Tisza Party under Péter Magyar could create the conditions for reversing Orbán-era illiberal policies both domestically and internationally. Throughout the election campaign, Magyar concentrated primarily on domestic concerns, especially economic problems such as inflation and corruption, while foreign policy received relatively limited attention beyond repeated - but much-needed - assertions that Hungary belongs firmly within its Western alliances. Although Magyar made no direct statements and the Tisza Party’s 250-page-long Programme has not specifically referenced the Western Balkans nor EU enlargement either, several of his broader commitments and political messages are likely to influence Budapest’s future regional policy.

Protection of Hungarian kin-minorities, support for regional peace and stability, and political and technical assistance connected to EU integration will continue to represent overarching themes in Hungary’s Western Balkans policy under Magyar, too.

While Magyar has not explicitly addressed Hungary’s participation in peacekeeping missions in the Western Balkans, rebuilding trust with Western allies - including NATO and EU member states - could be supported through the continuation of Hungary’s substantial role in these operations, which are widely regarded as both professional and well institutionalised. During his parliamentary hearing, the new Hungarian defence minister, Romulusz Ruszin-Szendi, indirectly suggested that Hungary’s involvement in established peacekeeping operations, likely referring to EUFOR Althea and KFOR, would remain unchanged.

Magyar has also not provided detailed positions on the EU accession of the Western Balkans. Instead, he has concentrated on opposing Ukraine’s “fast-track” EU integration while emphasising the importance of respecting minority rights in future accession negotiations. Under Orbán, Hungary strongly advocated for the rapid integration of Serbia into the EU, citing geopolitical concerns such as migration and regional stability, while often placing less emphasis on technical accession criteria, especially rule-of-law standards. Magyar may place greater weight on rule-of-law considerations, both within Hungary and in relation to candidate states.

During her parliamentary hearing, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Anita Orbán reaffirmed Hungary’s support for Western Balkan enlargement, stressing that the process should remain merit-based and continue to be a key priority of Hungarian foreign policy. Further, the minister stressed that Hungary would continue to provide political and technical assistance to the countries that wish to integrate into the EU; this signals strong continuity with the previous regime’s agenda on EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans.

Magyar has also promised that Hungary would no longer function as a safe haven for foreign politicians seeking political refuge. Although his comments referred primarily to Polish political figures - partly as an effort to restore relations with Warsaw - the statement clearly also applies to former North Macedonian prime minister Nikola Gruevski. Gruevski became the first prominent foreign politician to receive political asylum in Hungary in 2018 and was assisted by Hungarian authorities in leaving North Macedonia despite an international arrest warrant. The departure of Gruevski would symbolise a broader shift in Hungary’s Western Balkans policy, as Magyar appears unwilling to continue supporting the illiberal regional network developed under (and by) Orbán.

Since Magyar has strongly emphasised accountability and promised investigations into the misuse of public funds, these commitments could also indirectly affect Orbán’s Balkan allies. In recent years, Hungary has provided not only political backing but also financial assistance to allied regional leaders. Ending such support would reduce Hungary’s role in sustaining these actors and could improve the country’s international image.

Pragmaticism with new opportunities on the horizon

Magyar has indicated that Hungary intends to maintain pragmatic relations with countries and leaders that previously enjoyed good ties with Orbán. At the same time, he emphasised the importance of rebuilding relations with states whose ties with Budapest deteriorated because of Orbán’s policies. In the Balkans, this could have two important consequences. First, relations with Aleksandar Vučić and Milorad Dodik would likely remain pragmatic rather than ideological. In such a scenario, Vučić and Dodik would lose one of their most important allies within the EU, as well as a major political patron and ideological partner. Second, Sarajevo and Pristina could gain an opportunity to strengthen bilateral ties with Budapest without the dominant influence previously exercised by Belgrade and Banja Luka.

The close Orbán–Vučić partnership negatively affected relations between Budapest and Pristina, particularly in the political sphere, and complicated Kosovo’s efforts to integrate into international organisations. For Kosovo, political change in Hungary could represent a positive development. Hungary has consistently played an active role within KFOR and has regularly ranked among the five largest troop contributors, currently maintaining roughly 400 personnel in Kosovo. Politically, however, Hungary has in recent years aligned itself closely with Serbian positions on Kosovo. Budapest demonstrated that recognition of Kosovo’s independence does not automatically translate into political support, as Hungary became the only country recognising Kosovo that nevertheless opposed its membership application to the Council of Europe. Similarly, Hungary refrained from condemning Serbia and its actions during the 2023 clashes in Zvečan, when nineteen Hungarian KFOR soldiers were injured - several seriously - during confrontations between Serbian protesters, reportedly organised and encouraged by Belgrade, and KFOR troops.

Likewise, the Orbán–Dodik relationship contributed to worsening ties with Sarajevo, most notably illustrated by Hungary’s opposition to the 2024 UN General Assembly resolution declaring 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Srebrenica Genocide. Hungary voted against the resolution.

A more pragmatic Hungarian approach could therefore provide both Pristina and Sarajevo with an opportunity to develop stronger relations with Budapest and potentially reinforce their international standing through closer cooperation with an EU and NATO member state, namely Hungary.

Re-ACT Lab promotes research and innovation as a means to advance governmental and policy-making reforms in Kosovo and regionally.