Instead of terminating their mandate, the German three-party coalition broke up in November 2024. The parties forming the government had been publicly arguing for months before – the final break up happened when the government was unable to agree on a budget for 2025. 

After a vote of no confidence, the German president called in early elections for February 23. In the meantime, a minority government composed of the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens is responsible for intermediate measures. Since no budget was approved, the administration has only limited room for manoeuvre within the procedure of so-called preliminary budget management.

Limited possibilities for foreign policy initiatives

Even though day-to-day government operations are running smoothly, Germany’s ability to drive European or international agendas remains limited. Within the European Union (EU), the times of an unsecure transition in both France and Germany make more decisive decisions unlikely at the current moment. The Polish Council presidency in the first semester of 2025 is set to take more leadership.

Since 2014, Germany has been promoting the so-called Berlin Process – a diplomatic initiative to foster European integration and regional cooperation amongst WB6 countries.[1] The process has been supported by all German governments since the time, comprising Christian Democratic (CDU/CSU), Social Democratic, Liberal (FDP) and Green political forces. Nevertheless, the activities of the Berlin Process have not always had the full support of the other governments of the EU and the region partially struggled in implementing the process. 

A break in a period of a new dynamic?

As a result of both, the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the approach of a more geopolitical EU, new dynamics in the Berlin Process and EU enlargement have been triggered: Within the Berlin Process, regional mobility agreements were successfully established (but lacking significant progress in their practical implementation). On the national level, North Macedonia and Albania opened negotiations (Albania even the first accession chapters). Montenegro assured the closure of three negotiation chapters for the first time since 2017. Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted candidate status. Kosovo handed in its official membership application and was finally granted visa liberalisation. Serbia signed an important Lithium Agreement, even though it did not progress on its EU membership path.

Since further steps on the membership pathway usually depend on a successful vote of the Council of the European Union, it is interesting to look at policy dynamics in this field in Germany: In the public debate, WB6 and enlargement topics usually gain visibility with concrete events such as summits or state visits. In the electoral campaign, enlargement is not a question that moves the voters. Nevertheless, who forms the German government has an impact on the relations with the region. 

Realpolitik on Lithium and Migration

In the recent past, the before-mentioned agreement and support of Chancellor Scholz for a Lithium mining project in Serbia has been criticised as being opposed to the responsibilities of Serbia in aligning with EU policies regarding the Green Deal. Some actors also wished for a more active reaction from the outgoing German government with regards to the migration deal that Italy’s Georgia Meloni struck with Albania (even though its realisation is so far blocked by courts).

Both topics are strongly influenced by internal demands and debates in Germany, which are seen that enlargement is not a priority for voters, more influential for the political discourse (even though not always relevant for diplomatic or technical discussions): Germany’s crisis-struck car manufacturing industry is highly dependent on raw materials, which are so far mainly supplied by China. At the same time, the internal discussion on irregular migration puts even parties with a more liberal stance under pressure, so they are looking for different options – including the legally and ethically very doubtful realisation of asylum processes abroad. Therefore, many politicians are keenly interested in the final outcome of the migration deal between Italy and Albania.

Such a domination of interest politics (and also the infamous German Realpolitik) can be seen as contradictory with the high demands towards the candidate countries in the enlargement processes, but also reflects the current changes and future discussions of the EU.

Let us therefore have a dive into the election programmes of the German parties competing for votes in the snap elections just ahead. Not all parties have published their final programmes, which is usually subject to party congress votes, but already the preliminary programmes give clear indications with regard to the planned enlargement policy. In the next sections, we will explore the policies that the parties set to enter the German Bundestag want to follow with regard to EU enlargement.[2]

The stance of the political group of the next chancellor?

The Christian democratic parties (CDU and its Bavarian sister party CSU) have been the main opposition force in the last three years. Currently in the lead for an election win, the Europe-chapter of their programme aims to “reorient enlargement and neighbourhood policy". Compared to the other parties, the programme foresees the longest statement on the topic of enlargement. In an indirect criticism of currently often political decisions of who is making a step forward in the process, they call for an “enlargement [which] is to be geared more towards the concrete achievements of the candidate countries – without compromising on the criteria”.

For the concrete enlargement process, the programme advocates for a step-by-step approach that offers “intermediate stages for candidate countries that do not yet meet all accession requirements but are resolutely implementing reforms towards membership”. While explicitly highlighting the EU future of the WB6 countries, Ukraine and Moldova, the programme negates the possibility of Türkiye joining the European Union. The CDU/CSU want to continue Germany’s engagement in the European Political Community but warns to create parallel structures to the EU.

A critically positive stance towards enlargement, as demonstrated by the programme, is also mirrored by statements of vocal foreign policymakers of the parties, such as Norbert Röttgen. Also, the candidate for the chancellery, Friedrich Merz, has repeatedly voiced his belief in the European future of the WB6.

Enlargement enemies

The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany), currently the second strongest party in the polls and infamous because of a public endorsement by Elon Musk and an absurd online talk Musk hosted for the lead candidate Alice Weidel, holds a different stance on EU enlargement. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution classified the party as a suspected right-wing extremist organization already several years ago. It is the - by far - the party with the strongest negative stance on enlargement: “We reject an eastward enlargement of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)”.

The draft election programme (the decision version has still not been published) also advocates for an end to the sanctions against Russia and the demolishing of the current European Union in exchange for a future “economic and interest community”. Since almost all parties expected to join the next parliament fiercely reject cooperating with the AfD, the negative stance of the party is unlikely to directly influence German foreign policy. Nevertheless, the strength of such a movement is very worrying.

Self-proclaimed enlargement heroes

The Social Democrats (SPD) of the current German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, are currently third in the opinion polls. The party has longstanding connections to the WB6. With regards to the enlargement policy, the programme boldly claims: “We have revived it”. The programme argues that enlargement is both of a high transformative and geopolitical meaning. 

“We are committed to the swift admission of the Western Balkan states. Tangible progress in the enlargement process, such as access to the single market, should make people feel that the path to the EU is worthwhile”.

This statement resonates with the request for staged admission, also presented in the CDU/CSU programme, but gives it a more positive process perspective, even though the following paragraph also highlights that the Copenhagen Criteria need to be met under all circumstances.

It is also worth mentioning that the SPD argues that a revision of the EU treaties is due to be realised the latest before the subsequent enlargement, which might represent a hurdle for enlargement.

Nevertheless, the enlargement policy outlined in the programme is very close to the policies lately implemented by the outgoing government. Chancellor Scholz repeatedly (co-)hosted and publicly highlighted Berlin Process summits, and the German Federal Foreign Office (led by a Green minister) pushed for steps ahead before and behind the scenes. At the same time, Scholz has also been criticised by the WB6 for engaging with Serbia in a disputed Lithium mining project. This engagement is to be continued by the SPD, as the programme demonstrates when highlighting the need for “robust supply chains and access to particularly valuable raw materials”.

Even though a fierce supporter of the enlargement will not run for re-election (Michael Roth, current chair of the foreign affairs committee, former State Minister for Europe), the SPD has other faces, for example, Bosnia-routed Adis Ahmetović, who will most probably try to follow up with a strong stance on the European future of the WB6. 

Enlargement at the core of EU?

The Greens, who are currently running the Federal Foreign Office with their minister Annalena Baerbock, are stating: “we want to strengthen, expand and reform the EU”. In their draft programme, they formulate the strong need for an EU enlargement with the countries of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova and express hope for a future European perspective of Georgia and Türkiye, given their return to democratic societies. The programme also stresses that the accession criteria need to be met. 

A more detailed policy is not outlined. Nevertheless, two critical friends of enlargement are running for (re)election to the German Bundestag, though with unclear chances: Viola von Cramon-Taubadel (former MP and MEP, now direct candidate in Göttingen), a big supporter of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, and Manuel Sarazzin (former MP, now candidate in Hamburg), who is as the governments Special Envoy for the Western Balkans also publicly pushing the governments from the region for change.

Other voices with unclear parliament representation

The Liberals (FDP), who finally caused the collapse of the government, are currently just polling around the 5% threshold.[3] As with the Greens, their programme is rather short on enlargement: “Institutional reforms are also necessary to prepare the EU for the next round of enlargement. After all, the accession of the Western Balkans region, Moldova and Ukraine to the EU in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria is in the interests of Germany and Europe.” Furthermore, they advocate for the end of the negotiations with Türkiye. 

The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW, Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht), a Russia-friendly split-off of the left party headed by popular politician Sahra Wagenknecht, is also polling around the 5% threshold. The relatively new party entered some regional parliaments in 2024 and is also part of two regional governments. The programme of the party is short and clear on enlargement: “We want a stop to EU enlargement that also applies to Ukraine, which will otherwise become a bottomless pit for German taxpayers.” Furthermore, they argue that German citizens should hold a referendum on each possible EU enlargement. As with the AfD, it seems highly unlikely that the BSW might enter a government since almost all parties exclude a cooperation on the national level.

The Left (Die Linke) is polling with less than 5%. Still, it has minor chances to enter the Bundestag through a specificity of the German electoral law, which foresees an exemption from the threshold in case a party wins multiple constituencies. In the current draft version of their programme, they advocate for their vision of enlargement: “We want an enlargement of the European Union based on solidarity, which requires compliance with social, ecological and democratic standards. Accession aid should serve the development of the respective countries and enable them to meet these standards so that the people on the ground also benefit. Reforms of the EU27 are also required to enable enlargement”.

The difference between the policies of the Left compared to CDU/CSU, SPD, Greens, and Liberals becomes obvious when looking at their overall vision: “Our vision of a peaceful Europe is not a Cold War 2.0, but an OSCE 2.0. A common security architecture for Europe should replace NATO in the medium term. In the long term, it could also include Russia and Türkiye – provided that all wars of aggression are ended”. Not only, therefore, the participation of The Left in the federal government seems to be unlikely.

What might programmes mean for policy?

While all political parties still hope to shift the opinion of the public to their advantage, making different coalitions possible, the current media discussions and public statements of politicians seem to make a coalition of the Christian and Social democrats under the leadership of Friedrich Merz most probable. A CDU/CSU-led government with the Greens (or Greens and Liberals) seems to be the second-most likely option. All of these parties are supporting the EU membership of the WB6, Ukraine and Moldova, referring to both geopolitical necessities and the need to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. While no substantial change in German EU enlargement policy is to be expected, it remains an open question of how strong the next German government will be and how much room it will give to European questions despite the many open internal questions from economic to social and security policy.

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1. WB6 refers to the geographical area that consists of the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia.

2. The summaries are presented in order of the current opinion polls. All quotations are translated by the author from the German language election programmes, some of which are still subject to final approval by the party congresses.

3. Currently, a party needs to win min. 5% of the votes (or win a minimum of three constituencies) in order to be properly represented in the Bundestag. Otherwise, the parties only have the chance to be part of the extra parliamentary opposition. 

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